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I: Introduction
In this paper I take a closer look at Bertrand Russell's ontology of facts, pro-
posed in his 1918 lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Part II is
devoted to the question what Russell considered facts to be, and what kinds of
facts he assumed. In part III, the controversy over two kinds of facts Russell
postulates is described; the opinions of Raphael Demos and Keith Halbasch are
considered for this purpose. Following this discussion, part IV investigates the
question as to what kind of analysis Russell is conducting that leads him to
negative and general facts. Finally, in part V, my conclusions drawn from the
combined information of parts II to IV are elaborated; the main claim being,
that due to the kind of analysis Russell is conducting, he is not making a mis-
take when he assumes negative and general facts.
II: What Facts Are
In his lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell introduces facts
in the very ﬁrst lecture. It is his ﬁrst truism, that the world consists of facts.
Russell considers this to be something so obvious that it is almost laughable to
mention.1 At that point Russell warns, that he is not trying to give a deﬁnition
of the word fact, but only an explanation. His explanation is, that a fact is
what makes a proposition true. As an example of a proposition Russell names
the sentence It is raining, and says that the proposition is that which is ex-
pressed by it. What makes this proposition true or false is a certain condition of
weather, Russell writes. Consequently, a fact can be something like a condition
of weather. Another example of a fact is a physiological occurrence, which
would render a proposition like Socrates is dead true or false.
We must not believe that an existing thing is a fact though, Russell warns.
(The thing) Socrates himself is not the kind of entity that makes a proposi-
tion like Socrates is dead true of false (according to Russell it doesn't even
make a proposition like Socrates exists true or false, for that matter). At ﬁrst
sight this might sound confusing, because, strictly speaking, the aforementioned
physiological occurrence is a part of Socrates, and in some sense Russell should
probably be able to admit that Socrates (the person as a whole) makes the
proposition true or false, because it includes the relevant physiological occur-
rence (but this depends on one's view of what a person is). Speaking of the
physical occurrence as that which makes the proposition true or false is simply
1Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism; Routledge 2010, p.6
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more precise, especially since it is not clear how we even deﬁne the thing (or
person) Socrates.
Facts are also a part of the objective world, or outer world.2 This is quite an
important idea, and we will come back to it in part V. The next fact about
facts Russell names is, that they are divided into several kinds.3 There are, for
example, particular facts, for which Russell names the example This is white,
which are the simplest imaginable facts.4 The next kinds of facts he mentions
are general facts like All men are mortal, and negative facts, like Socrates is
not dead. The word negative does, however, not mean that the facts are false.
Facts are neither true nor false, since those terms do not apply to the kind of
things that are facts, but to propositions, judgments, and statements. Another
important point about negative facts is made by Russell during the discussion
of the 3rd lecture, namely, that the word not does not automatically lead to
a proposition being negative, and that one has to take the meaning of the
utterances into consideration.5
Russell says that particular, general and negative facts are, however, just ex-
amples for kinds of facts, and that there are many more.6 At the beginning of
lecture four he says that it is philosophical logic that serves as an inventory [...]
containing all the diﬀerent forms that facts may have.7
There is more to be said about facts in general though. Russell writes, that
propositions are not names for facts, since there are always two propositions
corresponding to a fact: one that is true and one that is false.8 In addition to
that, Russell points out a relevant diﬀerence between names and propositions:
a name that does not name is meaningless, but a proposition is not meaningless
if it is false. In his 1924 essay Logical Atomism Russell mitigates/clariﬁes:
When I say facts cannot be named, this is, strictly speaking, nonsense. What
can be said without falling into nonsense is: The symbol for a fact is not a
name. 9
So far I have almost entirely focused on what Russell said in his ﬁrst lecture,
but he also makes relevant remarks about facts in the later lectures. In the
second lecture, he mentions that the things in the world have properties and
stand in relations, and that it is this sort of thing (having properties and stand-
ing in relations) that are facts. He goes on to say that these things, properties
and relations, are thus [...] clearly in some sense or other components of the
facts that have those qualities or relations., especially also because of the phe-
2Ibid., p.8
3Ibid.
4Ibid., p.26
5Ibid., p.46
6Although he does not explicitly say so, this passage on page 9 shows what other kinds of
facts he has in mind: Then there are facts about the properties of single things; and facts
about the relations between two things, three things, and so on; and any number of diﬀerent
classiﬁcations of some of the facts in the world, which are important for diﬀerent purposes.;
see also page 26 for a similar thought.
7The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.47
8Ibid., p.13 & 38; So what though? Cannot there be several names for one and the same
individual, for example (Cicero and Tully, Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens etc.)?
9Ibid., p.141
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nomenon that we can understand sentences or propositions that we have never
heard before, if we understand the components they consist of.10 (As a matter
of fact, Russell believes that one does not need to understand anything about
the real world in order to understand a logical proposition.)11
In lecture 3 Russell gives another piece of information about facts: there are
no disjunctive facts (no facts of the form p or q), because if a proposition is
disjunctive, more than one fact is relevant for discovering the truth or falsehood
of the proposition.12
The following table summarises Russell's view on facts in his Philosophy of
Logical Atomism:13
Facts make propositions true or false p.6
Facts can be things like
. weather conditions
. physiological occurrences pp.67
Facts belong to the objective world p.8
There are different kinds of facts, like
. particular facts
. general facts
. negative facts pp.89
Facts are neither true nor false pp.910
Facts cannot be named p.14
Having properties and standing in relations are
facts
p.18
There are no disjunctive facts pp.38-39
III: The Controversy Over Facts
a) Russell's Reasons
When Russell talks about negative and general facts, he makes some remarks
as to why he believes that they exist. I will mention a few in this section, and
a few more during the following two.
As his reason for accepting negative facts into his ontology, he says that there
must be something which makes negative propositions true (and positive pro-
postions false).14 And since he believes that facts are the things that assign
truth or falsehood to propositions, it follows that there must be a negative fact,
that makes negative propositions true.
10Ibid., pp.1820
11Ibid., p.27
12Ibid., pp.3839
13Page numbers refer to the 2010 version published by Routledge; see footnote 1.
14Ibid., p.41 & p.45: A thing cannot be false except because of a fact [...]
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For general facts, Russell even oﬀers an argument which goes like this: There
again it would be a very great mistake to suppose that you could describe the
world completely by means of particular facts alone. Suppose that you had
succeeded in chronicling every single particular fact throughout the universe,
and that there did not exist a single particular fact of any sort anywhere that
you had not chronicled, you still would not have got a complete description of
the universe unless you also added: These that I have chronicled are all the
particular facts there are. So you cannot hope to describe the world completely
without having general facts as well as particular facts.15 So Russell demands
that on top of mentioning every single fact, one has to mention that the facts
mentioned are all the facts there are. There are commentators who ﬁnd this
plausible. For example Wayne A. Patterson in his book Bertrand Russell's
Philosophy of Logical Atomism16 sees no problem with this view. He even says
that one can go a step further and apply the idea to every sort of general propo-
sition.17 But as we will see in section III c), not everyone ﬁnds this plausible.
b) Demos' Account Against Negative Facts
There are people who do not agree with Russell's account of facts. In lec-
ture 3, Russell tells the audience that the idea of negative facts almost caused a
riot when he lectured at Harvard.18 A member of Russell's audience at Harvard
even got a paper19 published in the journal Mind on the subject, which Russell
spends some time on discussing.
Russell mentions the following three points20 that can be found in Demos' paper:
(1) If you assert a true negative proposition, there must be something
in the world that makes it true.
With this Russell fully agrees.
(2) Negative propositions should not be interpreted like positive
propositions; they should not be taken at face value.
As Russell points out, Demos' reason for supposing (2) is, that he has never
experienced a negative fact. He has even conducted some experimental philos-
ophy on a small scale: I once undertook a fairly systematic interrogation on
the matter among intelligent acquaintances who had not given previous thought
15Ibid., pp.89
16Wayne A. Patterson; Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism; Peter Lang
Publishing (1993); pp.3233
17Ibid., p.33; He is right in pointing out that Russell did not explicitly do that, but he most
likely had it in mind.
18The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.42
19Raphael Demos; A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition; Mind, New
Series, Vol. 26, No. 102 (Apr., 1917); Oxford University Press; pp.188196
20Ibid., pp.4245. a), b) and c) in the original paper.
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to the subject and hence were least apt to be biased in their reply, and they
were practically unanimous in their testimony that they had never encountered
a negative fact and that every case of knowledge expressed through a negative
proposition was in reality of a positive nature, in a fashion which they were
unable to comprehend.21 So the intuitions of Demos' intelligent acquaintances
are on his side, but Russell does not share that intuition: If I say There is not
a hippopotamus in this room, it is quite clear there is some way of interpreting
that statement according to which there is a corresponding fact, and the fact
cannot be merely that every part of this room is ﬁlled up with something that
is not a hippopotamus.22
(3) The element not is not a qualiﬁcation of a part of the proposition,
but of its whole content.
Demos then oﬀers an interpretation of propositions with the element not: The
negative proposition not-p (the negation of the proposition p) is to be inter-
preted as expressing another positive proposition q, which is incompatible with
p.
Russell mentions two reasons why he does not ﬁnd this interpretation attractive:
(i) Sometimes one is more interested in the negative proposition than
in any compatible positive one.
Russell illustrates this with the example that if one asserts that this chalk is
not red one is more interested in the fact that the chalk is not red than the
fact that it is white. However, it seems like Russell is missing the point here,
and Demos could simply say that, as he writes, the fact that the chalk is not
red (not-p) should be interpreted as the fact that the chalk is white (q) anyway.
Russell does have a point though, since for something not to be red it does not
matter whether it is white or blue, or any other speciﬁc colour. This means that
if one asserts that something is not red, one cannot have in mind a fact that
the thing is white, since one might not know what colour the thing actually is.
However, it can be argued that one has in mind that it is some colour other
than red, whichever it might be. So the focus would lie on the existence of some,
admittedly unknown, positive fact. Russell has another reason to reject Demos'
theory though:
(ii) Demos' interpretation of not-p takes incompatibility as a funda-
mental fact holding between proposition, which is more complicated
than simply assuming negative facts, because if propositions (which,
according to Russell are not real) are parts of facts (which are real)
one mixes entities with diﬀerent ontological statuses.
In Russell's words: You have got to have here That p is incompatible with
21A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition, p.189
22The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.44
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q in order to reduce not to incompatibility, because this has got to be the
corresponding fact. It is perfectly clear, whatever may be the interpretation of
not, that there is some interpretation which will give you a fact.23
This, however, is Russell's interpretation, and something can be said against
it. Demos never actually writes that he takes incompatibility as a fundamental
fact. He writes that it is a relation holding between propositions.24 There is
not, as Russell assumes, a corresponding fact, because it is not a proposition
that can be true or false, it is a logical relation that if one thing is incompati-
ble with another, they cannot have the same truth value. Incompatibility is, in
fact, similar to a disjunction in its character: it would correspond to a molecular
fact, and since Russell rejects molecular facts, it appears inconsistent that he
would accept facts corresponding to incompatible propositions. Furthermore, if
Russell is right in saying that propositions are not real  which I believe he is 
it does not make sense to accept a fact which has propositions as its parts, and
Russell should not have misunderstood Demos in this way.
The way Demos is really accounting for the truth or falsehood of negative propo-
sitions thus seems to work,25 and does not even go against Russell's opinion that
the only way a proposition gets its truth value is through some existing fact26,
because negative propositions express positive facts. I think there is nothing
wrong with Demos' theory, but I also believe that a case for negative proposi-
tions can still be made.
c) Halbasch's Account Against General Facts
In his paper A Critical Examination of Russell's View of Facts27 Keith Hal-
basch deals with the question that if facts are needed for the truth or falsehood
of propositions, which kinds of facts are actually required. More precisely, he is
investigating the question whether positive atomic facts alone suﬃce to account
for the truth or falsehood of propositions.28
Early in his paper, Halbasch wonders why Russell rejects molecular facts but
accepts negative and general ones. If one looks at Russell's ﬁrst lecture, one can
ﬁnd this as his reason for rejecting disjunctive facts: It does not look plausible
that in the actual objective world there are facts going about which you could
describe as p or q [...]29 This seems quite similar to Demos' reason for reject-
ing negative facts: there just is no such fact to be found in the world. Russell
even acknowledges that30, but it still did not lead him to reject negative facts.
Halbasch points out, that molecular propositions have propositions as parts,
and this makes them diﬀerent in form. This still begs the question though: why
23Ibid.
24A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition, p.190
25If it does not, it has yet to be shown why.
26The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.45
27Keith Halbasch; A Critical Examination of Russell's View of Facts; Noûs, Vol. 5, No. 4
(Nov., 1971); Wiley; pp. 395409
28Ibid., 397
29The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.39
30Ibid., pp.4142
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does the form of the proposition imply that there is no corresponding fact? And
then we are back at Russell's reason that there just is no such fact in the world.
I will come back to this question in parts IV and V of this paper.
Halbasch goes on to point out something I also mentioned earlier in this paper:
that not should be treated like other truth-function operators (and, or, etc.)
which would make the proposition molecular and Russell would have to accept
that there is no corresponding fact.31 So, Halbasch, too, thinks that Russell's
rejection of Demos' theory is on somewhat shaky ground. Halbasch then moves
on to general facts. His plan is the following [...] one can clearly ask whether
general facts and existence-facts are required to give an account of the truth
conditions of the sentences of the standard modem logical languages. Then, the
model-theoretic procedures are directly applicable, and if they are successful,
and if these languages are adequate to describe reality, we will have explained
away the need for general facts and existence-facts.32 In other words, he wants
to give an argument that the truth or falsehood of general propositions can be
determined with positive atomic facts alone. Halbasch then expresses this in
technical terms, and says that a universally quantiﬁed proposition of the form
p(α)Φq is true if all propositions of the form Φα/β are true.33 And he adds:
[...] the truth of such a sentence does not require general facts [...]34
Halbasch then considers Russell's argument for general facts which I have men-
tioned in section III a) of this paper. To refute it, he uses his earlier argument:
He writes that general propositions should, like molecular ones, not correspond
to a fact at all.35 He also reminds the reader of his suggestion regarding the
truth-value of universally quantiﬁed propositions, which does not prove that
there are no general facts, but it makes their function in a semantic theory
pretty obscure which he thinks is very telling against them.36
Halbasch then goes on suggesting that Russell might have had a second argu-
ment; an epistemological one. This second argument is very similar to the ﬁrst:
to know the truth of a universal proposition, one must know the truth of a uni-
versal proposition noninferentially, i.e. through acquaintance with a general
fact. This way one can avoid the epistemological problem that one would need
to know a very large number of facts to know the truth-value of an universal
sentence. Halbasch names three diﬃculties he sees with this supposed argument:
(1) It is not clear, whether this strategy is also necessary for restricted
generalisations like All the men in this room are mortal.
Halbasch rightly points out that with a general proposition that is restricted
31A Critical examination of Russell's View of Facts, pp.400402
32Ibid., p.403
33Ibid., pp.405406; To rephrase his idea in a nowadays more widely-known terminology:
∀x(Fx → Gx) is true, if all interpretations (i.e. ﬁlling the logical symbols with actual content
like If Socrates is human, Socrates is mortal) of Fx → Gx are true.
34Ibid., p.406
35Ibid.
36Ibid., p.407
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in a sense like that (all the x in restricted area y) it is not clear whether such
a strategy is necessary. One would think that with a medium-sized room as
restricted area it seems plausible that one could know the relevant facts for a
restricted general proposition, if the conditions for the necessary observations
are favourable.
(2) It is also not clear whether one has to be acquainted with all general
facts or only with certain important general facts from which one can
deduce other general facts.
(3) Russell does not consider alternatives.
Halbasch names induction as a possible alternative, lamenting that Russell re-
mained silent about it in his lectures on Logical Atomism. Halbasch concludes
that this argument is simply too weak, and that he will be content to point
out that Russell had hardly even begun to show that our knowledge of universal
truth requires the existence of general facts.37 At the end he again points out
that the strategy of understanding general propositions in terms of atomic facts
is successful and thus more attractive than Russell's opinion.
IV: Assuming Russell's Viewpoint
a) A Logical Analysis
To understand Russell's view about the diﬀerent kinds of facts, I think it is
vitally important to think about what kind of investigation, or analysis, he is
actually conducting. He is hardly ever explicit about it in his lectures on The
Philosophy of Logical Atomism, so one has to do some reading between the
lines. He does, however, make a few clear statements, and one of the most
important ones is this: The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is
because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis
are logical atoms and not physical atoms.38 This distinction between a physical
and a logical analysis is mentioned again in the eighth lecture39. Russell does
not want to get at little bits of matter like electrons and the like, but the small-
est logical parts, or atoms. He calls these atoms simples40, and his conclusion
is, that there are three diﬀerent simples: particulars, qualities and relations41,
i.e. particulars and universals as many philosophers would nowadays say. In
a logical sense, these are the smallest bits of logical matter in Russell's logical
ontology. Russell also calls them objects42, and goes on saying that the only
37Ibid., p.409
38The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.3
39Ibid., p.113
40Ibid., p.21, p.31, p.111 and pp.141143
41Ibid., p.111
42Ibid.
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other object in the world are facts, which are made up of the simples. He points
out, however, that they are not properly entities in the way that the simples
are. The knowing of facts is a diﬀerent kind of knowing than the knowing of
simples, he says. What diﬀerent kinds of knowing is he talking about? Is he
speaking of the diﬀerence between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
description? If so, it would make no sense to doubt that one can be acquainted
with simples like particulars, i.e. a white chalk mark43, but would he want to say
that one cannot know facts through acquaintance? Halbasch would not agree
with this interpretation, and since Russell writes that one can be acquainted
with things like Piccadilly44, this makes it more likely that Russell thought that
one can be acquainted with facts. What else could he have meant? Again we
turn to an idea he mentions in his eighth lecture. He says that of things like
chairs and people we only ever know particulars through direct experience, and
that we then put these particulars together in our minds and interpret it as a
persisting object45, while they are only logical ﬁctions, as he calls them.46 Now
facts would usually involve things like chairs and people, as we can see in Rus-
sell's own examples (Socrates is dead etc.), so it is plausible that Russell had
this in mind when he spoke of the diﬀerent kinds of knowing regarding facts and
simples. A question worth asking is, however: what about a monadic relation
that really only involves one particular and one predicate/property, like if you
take the proposition expressed by This is white. You are certainly directly
acquainted with this, when you are talking about something you see at the very
moment you utter the sentence. Is it still a diﬀerent kind of knowing of the fact
This is white, because it just is a diﬀerent kind of entity (a fact), or does one
know this fact like one knows the property white, for example? This problem
has two possible consequences: a) Russell meant something completely diﬀerent
than I thought when he spoke of the diﬀerent kinds of knowing, or b) even the
fact This is white is known diﬀerently, due to its nature (being a fact). I prefer
the latter possibility for a reason which I will elaborate in the following section.
b) What Russell Means By Logical
In a) I mainly talked about what Russell ends up with through his analysis.
Now I would like to have a look at what type of analysis it actually is. In the
2010 reprint of the lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism by Rout-
ledge which includes an introduction by David F. Pears, he writes the following
about Russell's logical analysis: The idea is that, when we analyze the words in
our vocabulary, we soon reach a point at which we ﬁnd that we cannot analyze
them any further, and so we conclude that we have reached the bottom line
where unanalyzable words correspond to unanalyzable things.47 I do not think
43Ibid., p.28
44Ibid., p.23
45Ibid., pp.117119, or pp.1718 where he says the same about Piccadilly and a couple of
other things.
46Ibid., p.91. I suppose it is not objectionable to be acquainted with logical ﬁctions.
47Ibid., p.xi
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this is quite right. Russell was certainly oriented towards language, but his
treatment of the sentence The present king of France is not bald48 shows us,
that his analysis must have went beyond language itself, because if one looks at
the sentence, one would be more inclined to apply the negation to the predicate
(bald). In addition to this, Russell himself points out in lectures two, seven
and eight49, that language can be misleading, and that one needs a vivid sense
of reality to understand what entities there are in the world.50 Later in his
introduction Pears also writes: [...] [Logical Atomism's] central claim is that
everything that we ever experience can be analysed into logical atoms.51
This goes more into the direction of how I interpret the logical analysis: more
dependent on the metaphysical understanding of the world, instead of the lin-
guistic interpretation of sentences.
In his book Bertrand Russell's Logical Atomism52 Rashidul Alam also points
out the connection between logic and empiricism in Russell's Logical Atomism,
he puts it metaphorically: [In Russell's theory of logical atomism] logical en-
tities and empirical entities are made to shake hands with one another.53 he,
however, also writes on the same page that Russell invented  as opposed to
discovered  logical atoms for his ideal language. I do not think Russell would
have agreed to having invented logical atoms, because inventing entities is not
something a good metaphysicist does (this is left to science ﬁction authors).
But what does logical mean for Russell? In his book Our Knowledge of
the External World as a Field of Scientiﬁc Method in Philosophy54 there is a
chapter entitled Logic as the Essence of Philosophy, in which he explains his
view on logic. The book was published four years before Russell delivered his
lectures on logical atomism, but the parallels between the book and the lectures
are extensive enough to make it quite likely that Russell did not change his
mind in the meantime.
Russell starts oﬀ by saying that his logic diﬀers from the logic of Aristotle or
the logic of the medieval philosophers.55 The ﬁrst important advance in real
logic was made by Frege and Peano (independently), Russell writes; they both
discovered the diﬀerence between what Russell would call atomic propositions
(Socrates is mortal) and general propositions (All men are mortal), which in
traditional logic were considered to be of the same form.56 As we saw already in
this paper (and of course in Russell's lectures), he works with this (and other)
48That the negation applies to the whole proposition; see ibid. p.43
49Lecture two: ibid. p.17, lecture 7: ibid. p.100 & 105, lecture 8: ibid. pp.110-111
50Ibid., p.55. At this point he says that his vivid sense or reality made him understand that
no shadowy negative propositions are going about in the world.
51Ibid., p.vii; my emphasis.
52Rashidul Alam; Bertrand Russell's Logical Atomism; Mittal Publications (1990)
53Ibid., p.116. The line reminded me of what Pears wrote on page xxxvii: The marriage
arranged by Russell between logic and empiricism gives The Philosophy of Logical Atomism
its special character.
54Bertrand Russell; Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field of Scientiﬁc Method
in Philosophy; Routledge (2009)
55Ibid., p.26
56Ibid., pp.3233
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logical distinctions. Russell writes about the developments in logic, that they
enable us to deal easily with more abstract conceptions than merely verbal rea-
soning can enumerate [...].57 This going beyond verbal reasoning can, I think,
be interpreted as a sign that the logical analysis is not as strongly linguistic as
Pears wrote.58
Russell then promises to talk about the philosophical foundations of logic. He
starts by pointing out the diﬀerent forms of propositions. He writes: It is forms,
in this sense, that are the proper objects of philosophical logic.59 and at this
point as well, he speaks of diﬀerent kinds of knowing/knowledge. The form of
a proposition is not an existing thing, he writes, but something more abstract.
He further argues for the diﬀerence in knowledge by pointing out, that one can
know the constituents of a proposition, but not its form (for example in the case
of a long and complex sentence) or one knows the form, but not the constituents
(if it is not known what the constituents refer to).60
The forms of propositions are of vital importance to Russell. He holds the view,
that one cannot give a correct account of the world if one does not realise that
not all propositions are of the subject-predicate form.61 So he clearly sees a close
connection between the forms of propositions and the world, and the connect-
ing piece have to be facts. Later in the chapter Russell writes: But in order to
explain exactly how [relations of four terms] diﬀer from relations of two terms,
we must embark upon a classiﬁcation of the logical forms of facts, which
is the ﬁrst business of logic, and the business in which the traditional logic
has been most deﬁcient.62
V: Conclusions regarding Russell's Facts
Now that I have provided the relevant statements by Russell, I can put for-
ward my interpretation and theory regarding the controversial negative and
general facts. I will do this in the form of key questions which I will provide my
57Ibid., p.33. And he adds on the same page, that through logical reasoning we can clear
away incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber.
58On page 36 we can ﬁnd another reason to assume that a logical analysis is not overly
linguistic, when Russell writes that Grammar favours a certain form, but it is philosophically
not universal. Thus, language would (like in an earlier example I mentioned) mislead us in
that case.
59Ibid., p.34
60Ibid., pp.3435.
61Ibid., p.36
62Ibid., p.41; my emphasis. On page 47 he is even more explicit: Logic, we may say, consists
of two parts. The ﬁrst part investigates what propositions are and what form they may have;
this part enumerates the diﬀerent kinds of atomic propositions, or molecular propositions,
of general propositions and so on. The second part consists of certain supremely general
propositions which assert the truth of all propositions of certain forms. This second part
merges into pure mathematics, whose propositions all turn out, on analysis, to be such general
formal truths. The ﬁrst part, which merely enumerates forms, is the more diﬃcult, and
philosophically the more important; and it is the recent progress in this ﬁrst part, more than
anything else, that has rendered a truly scientiﬁc discussion of many philosophical problems
possible.
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answers to:
(i.) Why does Russell not treat negative and general propositions
like molecular propositions, for which he assumes that there are no
corresponding facts?
We have come across this question in Demos' and Halbsch's papers. In my
discussion I mention the diﬀerence in form between negative propositions and
molecular ones: the latter have propositions as parts. Demos argues for an inter-
pretation of negative facts as a relation of incompatibility between propositions,
which would make their form molecular. However, that Russell did not accept
this interpretation suﬃciently explains the diﬀerence in treatment. In the case
of general propositions, the question is less simple. As Halbasch's account shows
us, it is not completely implausible to believe that the proposition All men are
mortal includes propositions about the mortality of other men (all of them, for
that matter). Russell thus provides a separate argument.
(ii.) Does Russell's argument for general facts really go through?
I mentioned his argument in section III a), and while we saw some philosophers
ﬁnd it plausible, some do not. In Russell's Our Knowledge of the External
World as a Field of Scientiﬁc Method in Philosophy he says something that
can be interpreted as going against the idea that a general proposition is just a
conjunction of atomic facts and thus a molecular proposition. The idea is, that
a proposition like All men are mortal has the form If anything has a certain
property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the
thing in question has the other property; a form not mentioning any particular
things.63 The point hereby is, I think, that the form is independent from the
question whether the things in the world actually have certain properties or not.
But even if we know the properties of the things in the world, and know that
the relevant conditions apply, we still need to know something of this general
form (that general fact we need to add to our inventory or the world). I think
we need to diﬀerentiate between the purely metaphysical and the semantic64
plus the epistemic domain. In a purely (mind-independent) metaphysical sense,
there is no need for general facts, because if all men are mortal then every single
one of them is mortal and that is why they are all mortal, just because this is
how the world is. It is only in the case of an epistemic agent entering the picture
that a general fact gains its signiﬁcance. If the epistemic agent goes around in
the world to check whether every man is mortal, then it is important for him
or her to be sure that he or she has determined the mortality of every man.
The same applies in a semantic context. Suppose that climate change gradu-
ally kills every living being on earth, and that at some point only a giraﬀe, a
63Ibid., p.46
64I see a clear diﬀerence between a linguistic and a semantic approach, the former being
concerned with language as it actually is, and the latter being interested in meaning, and
what is expressed with language.
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lizard and a koi carp are left. Now consider the two propositions: the disjunc-
tive/molecular proposition The giraﬀe, the lizard and the koi carp are living
beings and animals ([Lg ∧ Ag] ∧ [Ll ∧ Al] ∧ [Lk ∧ Ak]) and the general propo-
sition Every living being on earth is an animal (∀x[Lx → Ax]). If expressed
at the supposed time they have the same outcome in the sense that they say
about the giraﬀe, the lizard and the koi carp that they are living beings and
that they are animals. However, the latter proposition provides an information
which the former does not: that the three animals are the only living beings
left. So there is an epistemic (due to the additional information) and a seman-
tic (because the meaning is diﬀerent) diﬀerence between the two propositions,
even if one can argue that there is no mind-independent metaphysical diﬀerence.
(iii.) But if there is no mind-independent metaphysical diﬀerence, why
do general facts diﬀer from molecular ones?
I think we have to conclude that Russell's metaphysics is not supposed to be
mind-independent. He does say during the ﬁrst lecture that facts belong to
the objective world.65 But when Russell explains what he means by the word
reality (which I assume he considered to be a synonym of objective world)
he says that it is simply everything that would have to be mentioned in a com-
plete description of the world.66 It, of course, helps my case that he speaks of
a description of the world, because a description is an action of an agent with
a mind, and this makes the distinction relevant for the reason above. Another
point in favour of the idea that the epistemic and semantic domain is important
is shown in the fact that Russell puts so much stress on the fact that facts are
what make propositions true, which is clearly a notion that concerns semantics
and epistemology, not only metaphysics.
(iv.) What does that mean for the existence of negative and general
facts?
Nothing conclusive in the sense that it would answer the question whether they
are real entities in a purely mind-independent metaphysical sense. However,
what all this tells us is, that Russell should not be accused of making a mis-
take when we assumes negative and general facts, because if we keep in mind
what kind of logical analysis he conducts (which is mind-dependent and focused
on the forms of propositions), it makes perfect sense to assume those kinds of
facts. I thus believe that the controversy over facts really only arises because of
the diﬀerent approaches: semantic and epistemic (mind-dependent) vs. purely
(mind-independently) metaphysical. Demos and Halbasch both chose the latter
approach, and thus came to a diﬀerent conclusion. So, if a case against negative
and general facts is made, it has to be done independently from Russell's logical
atomism.
65The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.8
66Ibid., p.56
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